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
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SECRET

C O N T E N T S

	Page
HIGHLIGHTS.....	1
WESTERN EUROPE.....	2
EASTERN EUROPE.....	5
NEAR EAST - AFRICA.....	10
FAR EAST.....	12
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	15
ARTICLES	
The New Israeli Cabinet	16
Soviet Espionage Activity At The UN	18

SECRET

SECRET**H I G H L I G H T S**

The USSR continued during the past week to react against western defensive and economic measures. Although the Soviet reaction has not yet fully crystallized, the shift of Molotov and Vishinsky probably indicates, as does the adoption of a militant policy by the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union, a continuation of present aggressive Soviet policy toward the West (see page 5). Meanwhile, evidence is growing in the Balkans that the Kremlin is preparing to take such drastic steps to overthrow Tito that military action could result (see page 7).

The invasion of southeastern Negeb by Israeli forces will complicate the work of the Acting UN Mediator and the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission (see page 10). This Israeli attempt to determine a territorial issue by force will weaken the desire of the Arab states to continue negotiations for a comprehensive settlement and has practically eliminated the possibility of an agreement based upon the UN partition resolution. Although this Israeli action will probably not result in a renewal of widespread fighting between Jews and Arabs, the recent trend toward growing stability in the Middle East has received an abrupt, though possibly temporary, setback.

Confronted with greater Security Council pressure to restore the Republican government to Jogjakarta and the collapse of Dutch plans for a Hague round table conference, the Netherlands Government may soon be forced to make new concessions in its Indonesian policy (see page 13). In China, Acting President Li Tsung-jen's "unofficial" peace mission to the Chinese Communists has apparently met a Communist willingness to bargain over some of their harsh surrender terms (see page 12). If General Ho Ying-chin accepts the proffered post of Premier, Li will then have a better opportunity to form a Cabinet both sympathetic to his peace efforts and more acceptable to the Communists (see page 12).

SECRET

SECRET**WESTERN EUROPE****GERMANY**

Berlin Currency Although Soviet reaction to the proposed issuance of the western "B" mark as the sole currency for the western sectors of Berlin will be swift and well-publicized, the USSR is not likely to interfere seriously or forcefully with the operation of the airlift. Soviet retaliatory action will probably take the form of further tightening of the blockade and may involve conversion of the Soviet eastern mark to a new currency. Soviet measures to curtail the movement of supplies from Soviet-controlled territory to the western sectors will increase the hardships of the western population, further impair the west sector economy, and probably require an increase in the airlift. Soviet authorities could tighten the land blockade by: (1) halting all rail traffic, including the S-bahn and streetcars; (2) cutting off water traffic on the canals; (3) stopping or sharply reducing pedestrian traffic between the western sectors and Soviet-controlled areas; (4) barring all mail service; (5) cutting west-sector long-distance phone cables, local inter-sector phone lines, and all telegraph cables; and (6) splitting completely Berlin's systems of electrical, gas, and water supply, and the sewage disposal facilities. In determining the extent to which these measures will be applied, the USSR will be restrained primarily by the economic repercussions in the Soviet zone, which would be deprived of important materials and skilled labor now being received from the western sectors of the city. If the USSR converts its present eastern mark, it will do so in order to prevent eastern marks presently held in western Berlin from flowing back into Soviet-controlled territory. Such a Soviet move would leave western sector occupation authorities with the moral obligation to redeem a very large number of relatively worthless eastern marks in order to avoid undue hardship for the German holders of this currency.

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET**ITALY**

Cabinet Crisis Although the withdrawal of the moderate Socialists from the De Gasperi Cabinet has been temporarily averted, the two principal issues which prompted the withdrawal attempt are still very much alive and may cause another Cabinet crisis. Although the moderate Socialists will probably support the Government on the first issue (Italy's participation in the Atlantic Pact), a large section of the party continues to be strongly opposed to such alignment. This section dominates the directorate of the party and may even win control of the party at its extraordinary convention scheduled for June. On the second issue, that of the Government's apparent leniency toward ex-Fascists, Moderate Socialists in Parliament have strongly attacked the Government, especially for its conduct of Fascist Marshal Graziani's trial and the exoneration of Fascist military leaders Roatta and Borghese. The proposed employment of ex-Fascists in key positions in the police force will further antagonize the moderate Socialists. In addition, the Government's general inaction on promised social and economic reforms leaves its Socialist members in an embarrassing position before the working classes which it seeks to represent.

PORTUGAL

Economic Troubles Growing popular dissatisfaction resulting from Portugal's deteriorating economy may eventually threaten Prime Minister Salazar's position, unless foreign aid arrests the present economic trend. This dissatisfaction is most pronounced among the country's middle classes, which provide most of the officers in the military establishment which forms the base of Salazar's regime. Commerical and industrial interests, which forced the resignation of the Minister of Economy in 1948

SECRET

PORTUGAL

because he had instituted mild austerity measures, will strongly resist any further tightening of controls. Meanwhile, Portugal's economy is going from bad to worse. The critical shortage of foreign exchange is forcing the Government to consider imposing import controls even more stringent than those already in effect. Markets for normal Portuguese exports have fallen off, while imports have reached unprecedented highs since the war. Poor harvests have necessitated increased imports of foodstuffs and aggravated the drain on foreign exchange. Failure of last season's sardine run has almost paralyzed one of the country's most important foreign-exchange-producing industries.

- 4 -

SECRET

SECRET**E A S T E R N E U R O P E****SOVIET UNION**

Recent Soviet reaction to western economic and defensive measures, though not yet crystallized, has thus far manifested itself chiefly by top-level changes in ministerial positions in Moscow and by an apparent shift in tactics by Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union. The implications of Molotov's and Mikoyan's shift from their ministerial posts will probably be clearer after the current session of the Soviet parliament, but no basic change in Soviet policy toward the West is expected. The USSR will continue its attacks on the Atlantic Pact, its obstructionist policy in the UN, and its attempts to gain control over all of Germany. Meanwhile, however, Communist Parties outside the USSR are apparently reverting to the active, militant policy of the 1920's.

Molotov-Mikoyan The Kremlin decision to relieve Molotov from his position as Foreign Minister and Mikoyan as Minister of Foreign Trade, although not an indication of any fundamental change in Soviet policy, probably does reflect a Soviet reassessment of the progress of the cold war. Molotov's shift may reflect the Kremlin's belief that the problem of formal relations with the West has been reduced to secondary importance by western gains and the growing inability of the USSR to make progress on the diplomatic level. Similarly, western gains have made it more imperative for the USSR to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe and Communist China. Thus, although Molotov may have been released for the purpose of taking over Stalin's position as Premier, he, as well as Mikoyan, may have been relieved of ministerial duties in order to concentrate on the pressing political and economic problems of the Soviet sphere.

SECRET**SOVIET UNION**

Communist Militancy The apparent failure of recent Soviet diplomatic and propaganda weapons to sabotage US-European defense efforts and to gain popular support for Communism has prompted the Kremlin to order Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union to prepare for militant and subversive methods in pursuit of Soviet objectives. This announced reversion to the active militant policy employed by the Communist Party in the late 1920's may, therefore, signify the end of postwar tactics which were characterized by so-called "legal" Communist operations within established political frameworks. This shift in political tactics apparently implies a renunciation of the popular-front technique of co-operation with non-Communist governmental factions.

Atlantic Pact Continued Soviet efforts to defeat the purposes of the Atlantic Pact are revealed by recent Polish feelers for non-aggression pacts with the Scandinavian countries. The Polish campaign is apparently concentrating on the minimum goal of preventing a formal Swedish alliance with the West. Aside from the strategic and political factors which make Scandinavia a natural goal for Soviet hegemony, the USSR's industrialization plans for Poland and Czechoslovakia depend upon an uninterrupted flow of imports from Sweden. Likewise, Polish coal has long played a significant part in Scandinavian industry, especially Sweden's. Thus, aside from the USSR's interest in preventing closer political and military cooperation between Sweden and the West, the Soviet Union is desirous of maintaining uninterrupted the vital economic lifeline from Scandinavia to the Satellites.

SECRET**YUGOSLAVIA**

Reports of increased military activity in Bulgaria and Albania, combined with recent changes in Communist activities in northern Greece, suggest that the Kremlin is preparing a greatly intensified campaign for the overthrow of Tito. Realizing that six months of dialectical battle and relatively minor diplomatic and economic reprisals have, if anything, driven Tito further toward the western camp, the Kremlin now appears to be planning more drastic steps, which may possibly end in overt military action.

Greek Guerrillas An apparent shift in Communist activity in Greece strongly suggests that the Kremlin has decided to abandon temporarily its campaign to gain control over all of Greece and instead to attempt to exploit the Macedonian question as an additional weapon against Tito. The guerrilla radio has announced that an autonomous Macedonian state would be proclaimed in March. This new strategy is probably an attempt to gain the support of the large Slavo-Macedonian population in northern Greece. The autonomous Macedonian state envisaged by the Communists would, if established, tend to undermine the Tito regime and would thwart Tito's deep-seated ambitions for a Macedonian state under Yugoslav control. The Kremlin may also believe that it can secure such long-range benefits as an Aegean port, a land route between Bulgaria and Albania, a curtailment of Greek economic resources, and a base which could serve as a strategic threat against Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkish Thrace. Aside from the possibilities such a plan offers for increasing the pressure against Tito, however, it is unlikely that the USSR will derive much benefit from raising the controversial Macedonian question at this time. Although

- 7 -

SECRET

SECRET**YUGOSLAVIA**

Greek Communist leaders have, in a hedging statement, announced their support for an independent Macedonia, the rank and file will ~~essentially~~ move aimed at the dismemberment of Greece. Moreover, even with Slavo-Macedonian reinforcements, the guerrillas would be too weak to hold ground against the Greek Army without open intervention by the Satellites.

Military Preparations Meanwhile, the USSR is reportedly stepping up military preparations elsewhere. Top-ranking Satellite military leaders are reported to be meeting at Debrecen, Hungary. Although the meeting may be designed to establish a "defensive" East European military bloc as a counter to the Atlantic Pact, plans for exerting greater military pressure on Yugoslavia may also be on the agenda. Bulgaria is reportedly increasing its flow of supplies to the Greek guerrillas in eastern Thrace. A noticeable increase in Soviet military activity has been observed in Albania. Soviet supplies and arms are arriving at Albanian ports, and numerous reports have been received indicating the landing of Soviet personnel and aircraft. Moreover, increased Albanian protests of Yugoslav-inspired border incidents, although at this stage probably a stepping-up of the war of nerves, could be used as an excuse for eventual armed action against Tito.

Yugoslav Reaction The Tito regime, in the face of these signs of increased Soviet pressure, shows no sign of capitulating to the Kremlin. Finally breaking an enigmatic silence on the proposal for an autonomous Macedonia, the Yugoslav Government has issued a denunciation, contending that the proposed campaign for an independent Macedonia: (1) would only create confusion in the ranks of

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YUGOSLAVIA

Greek and Macedonian guerrillas; and (2) was merely a part of the Cominform campaign against Yugoslavia. The Tito regime will exert every effort to prevent the formation of such a state and will publicly accuse Bulgaria of violating its past pledges for cooperation in handling the Macedonian question. In conclusion, there is no reason to believe that Tito will be intimidated by these Soviet measures, and any attempt short of overt military action will probably fail to dislodge him. Moreover, present Satellite armed forces are not strong enough to overcome the Yugoslav Army unless they are strongly supported by Soviet troops and materiel.

- 9 -

SECRET

SECRET**N E A R E A S T - A F R I C A****PALESTINE**

Threat to Peace The advance of Israeli military forces into the southeastern Negeb, in violation of the July 1948 UN truce, represents another attempt by Israel to determine by force a territorial issue which the UN has ordered to be settled by negotiation through the good offices of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Although this Israeli advance is not expected to result in a renewal of large scale fighting between Arabs and Jews, it will: (1) weaken the desire of the Arabs to pursue the present armistice negotiations; (2) complicate the work of the UN Acting Mediator and the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission; and (3) practically eliminate the possibility of a peace settlement on the basis of the 1947 UN partition resolution.

The recent signing of the Rhodes armistice created the impression that such a settlement could be achieved without further military moves. In order to encourage Arab cooperation in such a settlement, the US recently reiterated to the Arab states the concept officially enunciated in the UN on 21 November 1948 that, if Israel desired territorial additions beyond those specified in the partition scheme, Israel would have to offer an appropriate exchange. The forfeiture by Israel of the southern Negeb in exchange for western Galilee appeared to provide the best, and possibly only, means of establishing such a territorial settlement between Arabs and Jews. The present Israeli advance indicates that Israel has no intention of making such an exchange but, on the contrary, is determined to claim all the territory it can control. The Israelis will now assert that the Negeb territory they occupied was allocated to them by the partition resolution. At the same time, they will justify by right of conquest their control of such Arab-allocated territories as western Galilee, the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle, and Beersheba.

Unless Israel withdraws from the southern Negeb to its previous positions, the current armistice negotiations with Transjordan at Rhodes and with Lebanon at Ras en Naqura may be strained, if not broken off, and Syria and Iraq will be increasingly reluctant to enter into the negotiations. The Arab

- 10 -

SECRET

SECRET**PALESTINE**

states, which had been gradually coming to accept the status quo in Palestine, will again become embittered over Israel's lack of good faith and future intentions and may well become more disillusioned over the ability of the UN to support them. The difficulty of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement has thus been materially increased and the recent trend toward growing stability in the Middle East has received an abrupt, though possibly temporary, setback.

ISRAEL

Civil Air Policy Israeli authorities are apparently attempting to develop civil air regulations patterned after those of the US and to free the civil air program from the hitherto rigid control of the military. The advice of US technicians will be sought in establishing civil air regulations, and a single commercial airline, EL AL Aviation, will operate as the government's chosen instrument for international services. Reputable foreign air carriers will be encouraged to use the civil airport at Lydda, which will be operated by US-trained personnel. The first route proposed to be flown by EL AL will be from Lydda to Paris; no flights to the USSR are contemplated at this time.

TURKEY

Bosphorus Maneuvers Recent combined maneuvers in the Bosphorus area indicate that the training of Turkey's armed forces has not yet progressed to the point where the Strait can be successfully defended against a sudden, strong attack. Although basic, small unit operations were apparently satisfactory, serious deficiencies were manifest at the higher levels of command and staff coordination, such as command-post operation and communications. Weaknesses were also apparent in the employment of reconnaissance aircraft and such specialized equipment as submarine detection devices and searchlights. In view of the relatively short time during which US equipment and US training have been available, these deficiencies were not unexpected, and the lessons derived from the maneuvers should materially assist in the long, slow process of modernizing the Turkish armed forces.

- 11 -

SECRET

SECRET**F A R E A S T****CHINA**

Peace Progress Acting President Li Tsung-jen appears to have made progress in his attempt to initiate peace negotiations with the Chinese Communists. The National Government's "unofficial" peace mission, recently returned from talks with Communist leaders Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, has reported that the Communists seem willing to modify some points of their eight conditions for accepting peace. The peace mission managed to secure a tentative agreement to hold an "official" peace meeting sometime after 15 March. Despite Li's progress, belligerent Communist broadcasts and speeches indicate that the Communists still aspire to control all China, prefer to take over on a regional rather than national basis, and wish to establish control by political rather than military means. In any future peace negotiations, therefore, Li's regime would not in fact be a "national government" concluding a national agreement, but a single regional regime assisting the Communists to conclude additional regional agreements. As a matter of military preparedness, the Communists will continue to hold their armies in readiness for a southward drive if peace negotiations with Li's regime are unsuccessful.

Nationalist Unity Meanwhile, Li's efforts to consolidate his control over what is left of Nationalist China hang in the balance as a result of the resignation of ex-Premier Sun Fo and his Cabinet. This move has freed Li of one of the major obstacles to his efforts to consolidate his political control and has given him the opportunity to form a Cabinet more sympathetic toward his peace efforts as well as more acceptable to the Communists. Now under consideration to replace Sun Fo is General Ho Ying-chin (a former Chiang

SECRET**CHINA**

follower), who represents a compromise among various Nationalist political factions and has considerable influence with the Whampoa military clique. If Li fails to gain the support of Ho (or an equally powerful leader), Sun Fo's resignation will have caused great difficulty for the Li government. Regardless of the outcome of these political negotiations, Li's control is still threatened by a growing Chinese economic fragmentation. Chiang Kai-shek still controls the major part of the National Government's gold and silver reserves and Li's regime is facing mounting difficulties in collecting revenue from the provinces.

Consulate Closing The closing of the Soviet consulate in Peiping is probably a move to obtain local advantages rather than an indication of a fundamental change in Soviet-Chinese Communist relations. The Chinese Communists have imposed increasingly rigid restrictions on the activities of foreign missions in Peiping and other Communist-occupied cities. Thus, the USSR may have closed its consulate in order to avoid operating under the humiliating restrictions which have been imposed on other foreign missions. Such a step would not affect Soviet operations in Peiping or Soviet relations with the Chinese Communists, both of which can be effectively carried on through Party and unofficial channels.

INDONESIA

Pressure on Dutch Increased Security Council pressure to restore the Republicans to authority in Jogjakarta and the collapse of Dutch plans for a conference of all interested parties at The Hague may force the Dutch to make further concessions in their Indonesian policy. For a

SECRET**INDONESIA**

number of reasons, the Netherlands Government appears to be in a weaker bargaining position than the Indonesian Republicans: (1) the Dutch are attempting to defy the SC, thereby incurring the threat of economic sanctions from the Asiatic countries and the US; (2) guerrilla opposition in Indonesia will probably continue unless the Dutch can placate the Republicans; and (3) military operations are proving a heavy burden which the Dutch cannot sustain indefinitely. Added to these difficulties, the Dutch are losing the support of the Federalist Indonesians, a support which the Dutch have constantly cited as proof that their policies are actually in the interest of the Indonesian majority. It has now become very doubtful that the Federalists will negotiate an agreement for the formation of a United States of Indonesia without restoration of the Republic. Further SC action may be necessary to convince the Netherlands that modification of the Dutch stand is necessary, and compromises will undoubtedly be difficult to make without causing a succession of government crises. Liberalization of Indonesian policy, however, will probably be achieved through internal shifts within the major right-wing parties rather than through a basic change in the composition of the coalition Government.

SIAM

Uneasy Peace Current uneasiness in Bangkok has been heightened by the Phibul Government's arrest of many Free Thai proponents and the murder of four important followers of ex-Premier Pridi. The joint army-navy truce committee, far from resolving the Pridi-Phibul political impasse, has merely delimited the area of responsibility of the armed forces, and General Kach continues to exercise strong influence over the army and the Government, despite naval and civilian opposition. The present unsettled state of affairs in Siam will, in all probability, continue for several months.

- 14 -

SECRET

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W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E

V E N E Z U E L A

Labor Control The Venezuelan Government's recent dissolution of the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers and wholesale arrest of Accion Democratica labor leaders may be the first moves toward suppression of all labor unions. The reportedly imminent addition of anti-labor military personnel to the governing junta would give impetus to such a drive. Meanwhile, the action of the Government has created a "leadership vacuum" in the ranks of labor which the hitherto-ineffective Venezuelan Communist Party will endeavor to fill.

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SECRET**THE NEW ISRAELI CABINET**

In forming Israel's first non-provisional government, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion not only obtained a strong working majority in the Assembly but also succeeded in maintaining firm control for MAPAI. When Ben-Gurion invited the other Israeli parties to join MAPAI in the new coalition, he made it clear that those entering the government must accept the principle of collective responsibility and support MAPAI's program. The program is based on: (1) friendship and co-operation with both the US and the USSR; (2) an Israeli-Arab alliance; (3) a majority of constructive labor elements in the government; and (4) complete civic equality for women, Christians, and Moslems. Ben-Gurion rejected the demands of MAPAM (the left socialist party which had played a part second only to MAPAI in the provisional government) that the Government: (1) decline any Marshall Plan aid offered Israel; (2) refuse bases to the western powers; and (3) balance trade between the Eastern and Western blocs. Consequently, the MAPAM Council voted 150-33 to remain in opposition.

The new Cabinet is thus more completely dominated by MAPAI than was the provisional government. The 7 posts held by MAPAI include all of the important ones; the United Religious Bloc has 3 portfolios; the Progressives and the Sephardim 1 each. (Ben-Gurion is still holding 4 portfolios open for MAPAM and the General Zionists, who wanted more than the single post offered them.) The new government has an effective majority of 73 seats out of the 120 in the Assembly.

Although without MAPAM participation the government will be generally more conservative than the previous government, its policy will be comparatively clear cut and predictable, and it will continue to maintain theoretic neutrality while actually

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leaning toward the West. The advantage of having unchallenged MAPAI leadership and responsibility in the government is partly balanced, however, by the disadvantage of having the second strongest party outside the government. Moreover, because MAPAI is pledged to socialism and civil equality for all, it will have to obtain its working majority through co-operation with the older, more conservative elements in the state. MAPAM, composed largely of young, militarily trained agricultural settlers and unhampered by the responsibilities of government, will thus be able to go all out in attacking the government. In concentrating its opposition against the "pro-West" and "subservient" foreign policy of the MAPAI government, MAPAM may become increasingly pro-Soviet in its views. Meanwhile, the Herut, the Communist Party, and the Stern Gang will continue their vindictive, if ineffectual, opposition to the government.

- 17 -

SECRET

SECRET**SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY AT THE UN**

Arrest by the FBI of Valentin Gubitchev points up the entire problem of continuing Soviet use of the UN Secretariat for espionage and subversive activities. Potential espionage agents now employed in the UN New York office include more than 25 Soviet citizens, 38 Poles, 5 Czechoslovaks (Prague recently declared the other 25 Czechoslovaks persona non grata), 7 Yugoslavs, and numerous Communists and fellow-travelers of all nationalities.

While many of the Soviet-Satellite staff members are suspected of being Communist-Soviet agents, Soviet reaction to the Gubitchev incident provides the most concrete evidence of Soviet control over this type of activity. Jacob Malik, chief Soviet delegate to the UN, while acknowledging Gubitchev's UN association, claimed that he was a member of the Soviet UN delegation traveling on a diplomatic passport. Even so, Gubitchev's activities conflict with Article 100 of the UN charter, which binds all member nations to respect the international character of the staff and provides that staff members shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization and shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the organization. The Soviet demand that Gubitchev be released on the grounds of diplomatic immunity reflects the Kremlin's fear that Gubitchev will reveal the extent of Soviet use of the UN for espionage activity. Moreover, the USSR hopes to employ the incident to support its propaganda claim of terrorist police control in the US.

There have been other indications that Soviet Communist members of the UN Secretariat utilize their position for espionage or for furthering their own nation's views. The

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Secretariat of the first Balkan Commission in 1947 evidenced pro-Soviet bias on numerous occasions. An atomic energy film, officially released by the UN Department of Public Information, expounded the Soviet plan for atomic control with only a vague reference to the western proposal. A staff official in the secretariat of the Temporary Commission on Korea once prepared a statement (issued but later rescinded) which impeded the work of the commission by reflecting unfavorably on the fairness of the Korean elections. And, the disappearance of certain documents during the 1948 Paris session of the UN General Assembly was attributed to Soviet staff members.

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- 19 -

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59. Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
60. Secretary of State (Attention: Chief, Policy Reports Staff)
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- 66,67. Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee
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